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SELECTING OREGON’S JUDGES 
Hans A. Linde† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
How state judges are chosen is once again on the public agenda.1  
Media attention centers on judicial elections, especially when an incum-
bent appellate judge faces well-publicized opposition, either on behalf of 
competing candidates or in a retention election.  We should ask whose 
interests may lead them to resist change in the state courts and whose 
interests may lead them to marshal change. 
Recent developments have added urgency.  Decades of extending 
modern media campaigns and their attendant financial demands to judi-
cial elections eventually led to two unsurprising Supreme Court deci-
sions.  First, the Court declared that free speech principles apply to judi-
cial as to other elections, and second, that recusal is a necessary effect of 
a judge’s political indebtedness to major campaign contributors when 
such contributors have a stake in a case before the judge’s court.2  Re-
publican Party v. White rejected efforts to justify regulating the amount 
and nature of advocacy for or against judicial candidates more than is 
permitted in other elections because “judges are different.”3  The recusal 
remedy demanded by Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. has implica-
tions for judicial elections that critics resist by citing its description as an 
“extreme case.”4  But a state with any pride in its judicial ethics cannot 
 
† Justice Hans Linde (ret.), B.A., Reed College, J.D., University of California at Berkeley.  Justice 
Linde clerked for Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, and has taught at numerous universi-
ties.  He served on the Oregon Supreme Court from 1977 to 1990, and currently is a member of the 
Council of the American Law Institute and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.  
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1. See Brennan Center for Justice, State Judicial Elections, http://www.brennancenter. 
org/content/section/category/state_judicial_elections (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
2. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781–82 (2002); Caperton v. A.T. Mas-
sey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256–57 (2009). 
3. Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 784. 
4. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 (The CEO of a company planning to appeal a $50 million 
jury verdict contributed the statutory maximum of $1000 to an appellate judge’s campaign, spent 
over $500,000 on mailings and advertisements supporting that judge as a candidate, and donated 
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long leave a statement of its standards for recusal to the haphazard litiga-
tion of federal due-process formulas. 
The two constitutional decisions gave national impetus to what had 
long been sporadic concerns in one state or another.5  The cause of re-
form in the name of “judicial independence” found its Paul Revere in the 
retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who has rung the tocsin from 
Washington’s Georgetown University in the East to Washington’s Seat-
tle University in the Pacific Northwest, where she gave the keynote ad-
dress at a conference on state judicial independence.6  I participated in 
the Seattle conference, as well as another conference soon thereafter in 
Salem, Oregon, in celebration of the Oregon Supreme Court’s 150th an-
niversary.  These were lively discussions before public audiences rather 
than presentations of scholarly papers (of which there have been many in 
recent years).7  The following pages summarize a few personal observa-
tions on the topic of redesigning state judicial selection.  They reflect 
experience with only Oregon’s courts. 
II.  REFINING THE ISSUES 
National attention to state judicial elections is welcome, but it can-
not avoid oversimplifications. 
First, current discourse describes election of judges as an issue of 
judicial independence.8  This views the question through the eyes of in-
cumbent judges.  Independence, or impartiality, is essential, but elections 
 
nearly $2.5 million to a political organization that supported that judge and campaigned against his 
opponent.). 
5. The national concern has begun to draw congressional attention.  Examining the State of 
Judicial Recusals After Caperton v. Massey: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competi-
tion Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., Dec. 10, 2009.  That concern need not 
focus on legislating standards of due process for state courts; a more familiar and productive ap-
proach might be to provide a degree of financial support to the hard-pressed state courts if their 
judges are selected by the standards of professionalism and independence from electoral politics 
discussed here.  It has precedents in federal systems such as Germany, which relies largely on state 
judges qualified and largely paid with national funds. 
6. See generally, The Debate Over Judicial Elections and State Court Judicial Selection, 21 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1347 (2008); Conference, State Judicial Independence—A National Concern, 
Seattle University School of Law (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.law. seat-
tleu.edu/Faculty/Judicial_Independence.xml; see also Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judi-
cial Ethics After Caperton, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 229, 230 (2010). 
7. See Pete Shepherd, One Hundred Fifty Years of Electing Judges in Oregon: Will There Be 
Fifty More?, 87 OR. L. REV. 907 (2008); J. Christopher Heagarty, Public Opinion and an Elected 
Judiciary: New Avenues for Reform, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1287 (2003); Kyle D. Cheek & An-
thony Champagne, Partisan Judicial Elections: Lessons from a Bellwether State, 39 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 1357 (2003). 
8. See David Schultz, The State of Judicial Selection: The White Cases Revisited, BENCH & 
BAR MINN., Jan. 2010, at 40; Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics After Caperton, 
60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 229, 230–31 (2010). 
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and independence are separate issues—electing judges would be at least 
as problematic if judges were elected for life.  Just as important is how 
judges are chosen in the first place.  The commentary, both scholarly and 
professional, overlooks how a system that limits appointees to persons 
willing to run for election and excludes persons who reject this role 
skews the pool of potential judges.9  Most statewide judges whom I know 
would never seriously consider entering an initial election for the posi-
tion, and many would have declined an initial appointment if a contested 
election campaign had been a certainty. 
Second, only contested elections to state supreme courts draw me-
dia and public attention, as is true for appointments to the United States 
Supreme Court.  But what goals are common to selecting trial judges 
versus appellate judges, and in what respects should the selection differ? 
Finally, a problem in discussing American institutions, like other 
multi-state systems, is to separate what allows generalizations from what 
differs from state to state.  This applies to the selection of state judges as 
to much else.  All state courts perform very similar functions by similar 
processes, often compelled by national standards of due process.  The 
majority of state judges who face elections also face similar challenges in 
the nature and costs of modern campaigns.  In other respects, however, 
those challenges differ greatly with a state’s size, history, geographic and 
social diversity, competing interests, and political cultures.  They include 
the political dynamics of changing old institutions, such as judicial elec-
tions.  One must recognize what lends itself to a class picture and what 
requires individual portraits.  This applies even to apparently similar 
states like Oregon and Washington. 
III.  OREGON’S COURTS 
A.  History 
Oregon judicial history preceded even its territorial government, 
when the death of an early pioneer led his fellow settlers to elect one of 
their number—a doctor—as “supreme judge” with probate powers, so as 
to enable the passage of property titles to the next generation.10  At the 
 
9. See Roy A. Schotland, A Plea for Reality, 74 MO. L. REV. 507, 518 (2009); Roy A. Schot-
land, Six Fatal Flaws: A Comment on Bopp and Neeley, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 233, 235 (2008); 
James A. Gardner, Deliberation or Tabulation?  The Self-Undermining Constitutional Architecture 
of Election Campaigns, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1413, 1469 n.215 (2007). 
10. The colorful early history of Oregon’s courts has often been recounted.  See, e.g., 
OREGON SUPREME COURT RECORD, [with] LAWRENCE T. HARRIS, A HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY OF 
OREGON, (Stevens-Ness, 1938); S. Smith, An Historical Sketch of Oregon’s Supreme Court, 55 OR. 
L. REV. 85 (1976).  Beginning in 1843, early settlers adopted and modified their “Organic Law,” 
shifting between simple votes in an assembly of settlers and election by a “house of representatives.”  
Shepherd, supra note 7.  Shepherd describes the delegates’ attention to the recent decision in Dred 
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time, there was no alternative to some form of election, but when Con-
gress soon thereafter created the Oregon Territory (reaching from the 
Canadian border to California and from the Rocky Mountains to the Pa-
cific Ocean), presidents in Washington, D.C., appointed judges who 
might or might not spend their time in Oregon. Oregon’s constitutional 
convention, one of the last before the Civil War, followed the models of 
Midwestern states in the Jacksonian tradition of popular election of all 
officials, including judges. 
Originally, eligible citizens—adult, white-male residents—voted 
viva voce, or by self-prepared ballot slips.  In the mid-nineteenth century, 
firmly held partisanship was taken for granted, and candidates were 
known to be Democrats, Republicans, or of another party.  But party 
nominations were not the state’s business until the “Australian” ballot in 
1873 required election officials to know the parties’ nominees.  Judicial 
candidates continued to run as political party nominees until 1931, when 
the state introduced primary elections.  Since then, identification with 
one or another political party, even when widely known, has played no 
explicit role in electing judges and most other officials.11  Defenders of 
electing judges, however, must contemplate the more radical changes 
that modern developments, mostly in technology, have brought to elected 
offices.  They include the loss of the newspapers with long-term editors 
and staff that were the familiar forum for community news, opinion, and 
ballot endorsements.  Do we really want judges to maintain personal 
websites, write blogs and periodic newsletters (as legislators or their staff 
do), or seek attention and supporters on social media networks? 
Actually, no one demands that all Oregon judges gain office by ini-
tial election or that judges should be replaced after a limited number of 
terms.  Given midterm retirements and other career changes, more judges 
are now selected by governors than by competitive elections.  The Ore-
gon constitution leaves these appointments in the governor’s sole discre-
tion.  Most modern governors have awaited polls or other evaluations by 
state or local lawyers and consulted knowledgeable advisers before fill-
ing a vacancy.  Without legislative confirmation of judges, local legisla-
tors do not play the role that United States senators do in selecting fed-
eral judges.  In short, opponents of changing Oregon’s judicial selection 
 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), and its meaning for slavery in Oregon at the 1857 
constitutional convention.  Id. at 914–19. 
11. One may wonder how state judges still elected as party nominees can judge litigation by 
or against a political party, when receipt of large campaign contributions requires recusal.  Oregon 
retains partisan election for the original offices of governor, secretary of state, treasurer, and attorney 
general, for legislators and most county commissioners, but not for the state superintendent of public 
instruction and labor commissioner or for large numbers of elected county, municipal, and district 
officials. 
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system can defend their nineteenth-century populist principles at little 
cost in actual practice.  They benefit from responsibly appointed courts 
while maintaining the illusion that their judges are elected.  Still, when a 
judge does run out his or her term, the resulting vacancy attracts candi-
dates whose qualifications, beyond a winning name, voters are poorly 
equipped to assess.  Often, the vacancy attracts candidates whose names 
are familiar from prior ballots for other political offices.12 
B.  Changing Functions 
The work of the Oregon courts has changed greatly in the past fifty, 
let alone one hundred and fifty, years.  For generations, state judges pre-
sided over trials of conventional crimes and common law disputes about 
real property, contracts, and torts, as they still do.  In some counties, ju-
venile matters, probate, and some misdemeanors were left to the elected 
county judge or justice of the peace.13  Occasional review of a govern-
mental action was an important but infrequent part of a judge’s work 
which was complicated by an antiquated system of writs.  Most state su-
preme court justices were former trial judges and saw their task mainly 
as examining whether the judge trying a case had made an erroneous rul-
ing on a properly stated motion or objection, on whatever legal grounds 
the appellant briefed on appeal. 
Their work changed with the growth of statutory, administrative, 
and constitutional law and with the creation of the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals in 1969.14  With that court handling the bulk of the caseload, the 
supreme court could devote its largely discretionary jurisdiction to re-
 
12. Supreme Court Justices of Oregon, http:bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/ elec-
tions27.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2010).  In 1988, two long-serving state senators from metropolitan 
areas ran first and second of four candidates for a seat on the Oregon Supreme Court.  A few years 
later in 1996, another long-serving legislator, then attorney general, defeated an appellate judge for a 
supreme court vacancy, which he soon relinquished to run for governor.  But name familiarity need 
not be political; an appointee to Oregon’s state-wide court of appeals lost to a self-starting candidate 
with a famous pioneer name.  (The runner-up was later reappointed and thereafter went on the serve 
on the supreme court.) 
For Washington’s experience with the drawing power of familiar names associated with an unrelated 
person or context, see William W. Baker, Named to the Bench, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 128 (2003).  
In North Carolina in 1998, a respected incumbent was defeated in the primary by a challenger who 
happened to have the same name as a popular recent governor, and who campaigned with signs of 
the colors and design used in the governor’s campaigns.  The nominee, in turn, lost to an opposing 
nominee with the same popular last name.  See J.C. Heagarty, Public Opinion and an Elected Judi-
ciary, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1287, 1297–98 (2003). 
13. See generally Roland Johnson et al., Justice Courts in Oregon, 53 OR. L. REV. 411 
(1974). 
14. See Stephen R. Armitage, History of the Oregon Judicial Department, Part 2: After 
Statehood (2009), available at http://www.oregon.gov/SOLL/images/OregonJudicial Departmen-
tHistoryPt2_04_2009.pdf. 
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solving new issues or clarifying old ones.  Because these tasks aim to 
guide decisions beyond the case before the court, they are less confined 
by what advocates argue and are more susceptible to divided opinions.  
Many appointees to the appellate courts now have had experience as ju-
dicial clerks or in Oregon’s Department of Justice, rather than on the trial 
bench.  But the same changes also put in question whether the goals and 
the criteria for state-wide appellate and local trial judges call for identical 
or somewhat varied systems of selection. 
C.  Previous Critiques 
Calls for changing Oregon’s system of judicial elections are not 
new.  In 1962, the Commission on Constitutional Revision, following a 
1959 commission report on the judiciary, recommended a system of ap-
pointment to which I return below.15  The revised constitution as a whole 
fell one senator’s vote short of submission to the voters, but the proposal 
for judicial appointments drew little controversy.16  In 1977, the legisla-
ture submitted a variant of the American Judicature Society’s plan 
(sometimes called the Missouri plan) of gubernatorial appointment from 
a list nominated by a commission, which the voters rejected.17  This was 
thirty-two years ago, before judicial elections became battlegrounds for 
the heavy weaponry of professional campaign managers.18 
Since then, critical accounts of particularly bitter, outrageous, or 
expensive contests for judgeships have been biennial staples of press re-
ports around the nation (as well as a popular novel) and of many profes-
sional symposia.19  As both Chief Justice Paul De Muniz and former At-
torney General David Frohnmayer have observed, Oregon has not been 
spared such contests, though neither the level of raw invective nor ex-
penditures match that in more populous and excitable states.20  The large 
 
15. Shepard, supra note 7, at 921. 
16. Shepard, supra note 7, at 922. 
17. S.J. Res. 6, 1977 Or. Laws 1990 (1977). 
18. In its 1996 report, Washington’s Walsh Commission on Judicial Selection recited familiar 
quotations from citizens that they did not know the names of any judges and did not really know 
what judges do, but that polls nonetheless showed majorities for keeping elections. The commission 
therefore sought a compromise of inserting nominating commissions into what ostensibly would 
remain an elective system, as stressed in the title of the report., See WALSH COMM’N, THE PEOPLE 
SHALL JUDGE: RESTORING CITIZEN CONTROL TO JUDICIAL SELECTION (1996). 
19. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1995, 1996–98 (1988); Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan 
Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397, 1399–1404 (2003); JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL 
(Doubleday 2008); Hans A. Linde, The Judge as Political Candidate, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 6–7 
(1992). 
20. Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to Judicial Independ-
ence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367, 374–85 (2002); David B. Frohnmayer, Election of State Appel-
late Judges, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1251, 1254 (2003).  Frohnmayer described a “snarling, sarcas-
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sums needed for serious media campaigns, however, ordinarily come 
from sources interested in the legal answers decided by appellate judges. 
D.  State and Local Perspective 
What does this mean for the selection and tenure of trial judges?  
Although trial and appellate judges equally need both relevant profes-
sional skills and judicial independence, there also are important differ-
ences in the qualities demanded in trial courts, as well as in how voters 
may evaluate a judge’s performance. Trial judges make discretionary 
decisions in individual cases that are never reviewed on appeal.  While 
most people never see an appellate court, many observe trial judges first 
hand as jurors, witnesses, parties or interested neighbors in family, juve-
nile, or everyday criminal cases.  Attention, patience, and courtroom de-
meanor therefore matter.  Voters are unlikely to fault the judge for legal 
errors in run-of-the mill litigation that become the stuff of appeals.  Out-
side metropolitan areas with multi-judge courts, judges will be personally 
known to molders of public opinion, including county seat editors, where 
they still exist.21  A controversial decision is grist for opponents of su-
preme court justices and trial judges alike, but a locally-elected judge can 
also be more exposed and vulnerable than any appellate judge, at a frac-
tion of the cost, when the law compels an unpopular outcome, adverse to 
a local economic interest or dividing the community along ethnic or oth-
er social fault lines.  Visibility, or expectations of hometown justice, may 
affect an elected trial judge more than the distant appellate judges who 
review the decision months after the event. 
E.  Designing an Alternative 
1.  Commission Models: Who Initiates and Who Decides? 
Some features of the American Judicature Society (AJS) model 
poses intrinsic problems.  The model leaves the governor responsible for 
an appointed judiciary, yet it limits the governor’s options to a list of 
names chosen by other people.22  This constraint goes well beyond laws 
 
tic and vicious radio ad” in a court of appeals campaign, apparently produced by a political cam-
paign consultant as an independent expenditure by an “agriculture-related PAC,” for which the can-
didate against the incumbent would not be accountable.  Id. at 1252–53. 
21. At the Seattle conference, a comment from the audience recommending that judges min-
gle more with people in the community led one panelist, Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson, to describe 
the realities preventing this image of personal interaction in Texas cities and suburbs.  Texas Su-
preme Court Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson, Comments at the Conference for State Judicial Inde-
pendence—A National Concern (Sept. 14, 2009). 
22. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS 1–2 (2008), available 
at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/MJSP_ptr_3962CC5301809. pdf. 
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requiring some agency boards to include members from affected catego-
ries.23  The design shifts the political focus to the composition and selec-
tion of the nominating commission, and it leaves governors to find back 
channels to get one name or another on the commission’s list.24 
Appointment of judges by the political executive of the day is not 
indispensable; early state legislatures appointed judges,25 and the system 
survives in a small minority of states.26 
Many national systems of selection and promotion are designed to 
secure a professional career judiciary, but those also differ in other re-
spects.27  California leaves the initial choice of appellate judges to the 
governor, subject to a form of professional control: it requires the gover-
nor’s appointees to be confirmed by a commission composed of the chief 
justice, the senior judge of the courts of appeals, and the state’s elected 
attorney general.28  Thereafter, appellate judges are subject to periodic 
retention elections.29 
Many appellate judges resist retention elections, including Wiscon-
sin’s Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, a battle-hardened veteran of re-
 
23. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(a) (2010) (requiring judicial nominating commis-
sion to be comprised of certain members); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-2(a) (2010) (similar). 
24. A critical commentary described the selection of a Missouri supreme court justice under 
that state’s commission system: 
An ostensibly non-partisan seven-member commission chooses a slate of three nominees 
and the Governor chooses among them.  The idea was to produce candidates based on 
merit while diluting political influence over courts. 
 But that was then.  Anybody with the power to choose judicial candidates was 
also destined to become a political actor.  And that’s exactly what happened. . . .  Now 
Republican Governor Matt Blunt finds himself battling the Missouri bar over the com-
mission’s latest panel of candidates. . . . 
Review and Outlook, Show Me the Judges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2007, at A10. 
25. See JAMES QUAYLE DEALEY, GROWTH OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS: FROM 
1776 TO THE END OF THE YEAR 1914 39, 261 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1915). 
26. See S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3; VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. 
27. The roles of trial judges and lawyers in American courts differ from those in civil law 
systems in ways that demand prior experience rather than some form of civil service exams; judges 
generally are appointed from professional law practice.  Closer to the civil law system may be the 
evolving role of unelected administrative law judges, who now are meant to be independent of ex-
ecutive agencies and of parties affected by agency actions.  Of course, the actual performance of 
courts around the world and over time reflects more important differences than selection systems. 
28. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16, cl. (d)(2).  The system has not always precluded political con-
siderations.  In 1938, Governor Cuthbert Olsen nominated a well-known professor, Max Radin of 
the University of California, to the supreme court.  The chief justice supported the appointment, but 
it was rejected by the votes of the senior appellate judge and an ambitious Republican attorney gen-
eral, Earl Warren, who objected to Radin’s political views.  JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF 
JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 12 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1989).  The 
governor then appointed Radin’s colleague, Roger Traynor.  Id. 
29. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16, cl. (a). 
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peated competitive elections who participated in the Seattle conference.30  
In a retention election, groups whose interests are affected by the appel-
late courts’ decisions can finance a campaign to reject an incumbent 
judge, on whatever grounds will stir negative votes, without having to 
identify a replacement.  The 1986 defeat of California Justices Cruz 
Reynoso and Joseph Grodin in retention elections, along with the gover-
nor’s more provocatively chosen Chief Justice Rose Bird, became cau-
tionary examples.31  In contrast, when a voter can choose only between 
the incumbent judge and one or more other candidates, the challengers’ 
qualifications and records are also fair game.32  Often the judge faces no 
competitor for reelection, at least in states without party nominations.33  
Still, even lacking a serious contender, Oregon groups sometimes seek 
out and sponsor a candidate (sometimes one of their lawyers) so as to 
alert voters to their annoyance with a judge, or as a caution to others.34 
2.  Who Cares About the Selection of Judges? 
In the search for organized interests, it is easy to overlook those 
personally involved: lawyers who actually aspire to a judicial career, and 
judges seeking to advance to a higher court.  “Higher,” in this context, 
has a financial component that also becomes a higher pension, especially 
when a formula makes the salary a factor to be multiplied by years in 
other public offices.  The ironic implication is that raising salaries for 
underpaid state judges may reduce their job security.  Except for some-
one with an already familiar or appealing name, however, a contested 
 
30. Conference, State Judicial Independence—A National Concern; Seattle University School 
of Law (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.law.seattleu.edu/Faculty/Judicial 
_Independence.xml; see also Colloquy, A Conversation About Judicial Independence and Impartial-
ity, 6 JUDICATURE 339, 342 (2006). 
31. See GRODIN, supra note 28, at 174 (observing that the $7,000,000 raised to defeat the 
three justices came from other sources than fans of capital punishment); see PREBLE STOLZ, 
JUDGING JUDGES: THE INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT (The 
Free Press 1981). 
32. Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995, 
2003 (1987–88); see James L. Huffman, Politics and Judicial Independence: A Proposal for Reform 
of Judicial Selection in Oregon, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1425, 1427 (2003). 
33. States with partisan elections include Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, New 
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia.  See American Judicature Society, Judicial 
Selection in the States, http://www.judicialselection.us/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2010); see also Huff-
man, supra note 32, at 1426 (noting that the 2003 Oregon Court of Appeals election was unusual in 
that there were two candidates). 
34. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Hans Linde and His 1984 Judicial Election: The Primary, 70 
OR. L. REV. 747 (1991); Hans Linde, Oregon’s Property Rights Debate, Presentation at Georgetown 
Envtl. Law and Policy Inst. Conf., U.C. Berkeley (Oct. 10, 2002) (describing campaign against 
Judge David Schuman). 
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election campaign demands money and organized efforts.  Who will pro-
vide these, and to what end? 
In Oregon campaigns, the focus on crimes, sentences, and the death 
penalty common in the 1980s has widened to include issues of land-use 
controls, taxes, and initiative measures.35  Elsewhere, campaign issues 
may extend to governmental display of religious symbols or teaching 
evolution in public schools.  The Supreme Court’s decisions on abortion 
and sodomy laws has federalized all these divisive issues, but the split 
between appointed and elected state courts on the constitutional status of 
marriage may not be wholly coincidental.36  Ideology apart, what state 
judicial doctrines now matter? 
One political battleground, surprisingly, is the common law of 
torts—substantively in product liability and procedurally in the form of 
class action.37  Plaintiffs’ lawyers have been national whipping boys 
since the presidential campaign of George H. W. Bush, and they in turn 
have been actively involved in elections of state judges and of governors 
who appoint them.  Moreover, where lawmakers have been persuaded to 
enact limits on damages, state judges have invalidated them under one or 
another clause of their state’s constitution.  Tort and property issues now 
also have moved to the federal agenda.  From punitive damages to “tak-
ings” by land-use control to damages for medical malpractice to the con-
gressional debate of health insurance, each has moved to the federal lev-
el.  In Oregon, a second battleground has been the use of initiative law-
making to restrict what critics deemed to be overly generous benefits for 
public employees, a restriction that the Oregon Supreme Court held to 
violate the federal “contract clause.”38  The legislative sponsor of that 
measure, Bob Tiernan, later entered a race for the court.39 
 
35. See Paul J. De Muniz, Judicial Selection in Oregon: Money, Politics, and the Initiative 
Process, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1265, 1269 (2003). 
36. See generally Anthony Champagne, Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. 
REV. 669, 684 (2002). 
37. For an example from Texas, see Kyle D. Cheek & Anthony Champagne, Partisan Judi-
cial Elections: Lessons From a Bellwether State, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1357, 1366–71 (2003). 
38. U.S.CONST. art. I, § 10; see also Oregon State Police Officers’ Ass’n v. State, 323 Or. 
356, 361 (1996). 
39. See Oregon Republican Party, Chairman Bob Tiernan, http://www.oregonrepublican 
party.org/node/87 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010); see also Judge of the Supreme Court Candidate: Bob 
Tiernan, http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov398/guide/npart/tiernb.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 
2010). 
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3. An Alternative Forum for Concerned Groups 
Most people and groups who care at all about the composition of a 
state’s courts do so from political interests, not professional ones.40  Re-
formers must persuade these political interest groups to support a more 
thoughtful way to engage the selection process rather than to sponsor or 
finance campaigns to elect one judge or another. 
How might a state design judicial selection to reflect the institu-
tional and political elements discussed in the foregoing pages: stake-
holders in appellate decisions, especially in constitutional questions; 
geographic and social groups looking for understanding faces on the 
bench, especially in trial courts; the minimized relevance of party poli-
tics; clear responsibility for selection coupled with some form of collec-
tive assent; and above all else, assured professional qualifications for 
judging?  The relative importance of all but the professional element will 
differ from state to state, but the primacy of the professional-
qualification element excludes simple popular election, which invites 
judicial candidacies based solely on prior political or other name famili-
arity, organizational sponsorship, or access to campaign funding. 
F.  A Framework for Oregon 
1. The 1962 Proposal 
Oregon’s 1962 plan for a modern state constitution accepted the ba-
sic AJS concept of dividing judicial selection between a multi-member 
commission and a unitary appointing authority—the governor—followed 
by a retention election.41  The revised constitution contemplated a proc-
ess of consultation between the governor and a state law commission to 
be established by statute, but the constitution would not limit the gover-
nor’s choice to names initially presented by the commission.42  (The fed-
eral Constitution similarly contemplated “advice” from the Senate as 
 
40. One exception is the League of Women Voters, which studied the topic in 2007.  See 
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF OREGON, THE OREGON JUDICIARY PART II: CHALLENGES FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY, available at http://www.lwvor.org/documents/ORJudiciaryPt2Chall 2007.html (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2010). 
41. Shepherd, supra note 7, at 921–22. 
42. The proposed text provided as follows: 
A State Law Commission may be established in a manner provided by law to make stud-
ies, reports and recommendations to the Legislative Assembly on law and its administra-
tion, to the Governor on judicial selection and to the Supreme Court on rules of proce-
dure, and to perform additional advisory services as may be provided by law. 
THE COMMISSION FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR OREGON: A REPORT 
TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE 52ND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (1962), reprinted in 67 OR. L. REV. 127, 
149 (1988).  The text was included to allow legislators, judges, executive officials, and private 
members to serve together on the commission despite the constitution’s general separation of pow-
ers. 
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well as final “consent” to the President’s appointment of judges and oth-
er high officials.43)  In effect, the proposal invited both the commission 
and the governor to originate names of potential nominees and to consult 
about the choice, but it left details of the process to legislation or to po-
litical practice.  The plan was adequate for its time, when the bulk of the 
courts’ work did not involve controversial government policies or con-
flicts among major organized interests or about diversity on the bench.  
Selection of judges not followed by an election now needs greater speci-
ficity. 
2.  Initial Selection 
Without such an election, one option for selecting judges is execu-
tive appointment subject to some process of confirmation or rejection, as 
in the federal or the California model.  A version has been recommended 
for Oregon by James Huffman, former Dean of Lewis & Clark Law 
School.44  Another is the AJS model of nomination by a collective group 
that confines a governor’s choice to a few names, even if it includes the 
option to reject all and ask for additional nominations.45  The two 
schemes differ fundamentally, but both invite exploratory communica-
tions in some form, open or sub rosa—the consultation proposed in the 
1962 draft. 
Oregon, in fact, has a statutory law commission, established in 
1997 to advise lawmakers and agencies about legal reforms.46  The Ore-
gon Law Commission includes legislators appointed from both parties in 
the Oregon House and Senate, the attorney general, the chief justice of 
the supreme court, the chief judge of the court of appeals, and a trial 
judge.  Other members include an appointee of the governor, the deans or 
professors from Oregon’s three law schools, and lawyers appointed by 
the Oregon State Bar.47  Its basic structure includes the use of committees 
for various functions.48  This structure could readily be adapted to the 
role of evaluating and recommending the relative professional qualifica-
tions and skills of potential appointees to appellate courts, as was con-
templated in the revised constitution. 
 
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
44. See Huffman, supra note 32. 
45. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS 1 (perm. ed., 
rev. vol. 2008), available at http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs /MJSP_web.pdf. 
46. The commission’s origins and subsequent history are the subject of 44 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. No. 2 (2008). 
47. OR. REV. STAT. § 173.315(2)-(3) (2009). 
48. OR. REV. STAT. § 173.315 (2009). 
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Oregon’s law commission, however, is no venue for weighing other 
elements in shaping the judiciary—neither the competing interests of 
economic stakeholders nor demands for geographic or social balance on 
the courts.  These interests are unavoidably political.  Where the initial 
selection of potential judges is assigned to a judicial nominating commis-
sion, the composition of the commission itself becomes the object of 
competing demands for inclusion.  Combining the professional and po-
litical functions in a single commission would only distort the composi-
tion and the work of the law commission. 
If the non-political law commission contemplated in the 1962 re-
vised constitution considers only professional qualifications, where 
might “political” representation in the selection of judges be placed?  For 
many reasons, senate confirmation is not the answer for Oregon, what-
ever one thinks of its use at the national level, where appellate nominees 
have become targets for routine displays of partisan ideology and sena-
tors insist on controlling appointments to district courts.49  At best, legis-
lators have diverse political agendas with which a vote on a judicial nom-
ination may become entangled. Oregon’s part-time legislature also lacks 
many long-term, experienced lawyer members like those serving on the 
U.S. Senate’s judiciary committee. 
Might it be better to add a separate “citizens’ panel” to reflect (not 
“represent”50) the variety of geographic, social, and economic sectors 
that have distinctive interests in appellate opinions, interests that they 
now press on governors and pursue by financing election campaigns or 
ballot measures to reshape the courts?51  The members of such a panel, 
whether titled a “commission” or something else, must know something 
 
49. See Warren Richey, What May Be Behind Long Nominee Battles, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Apr. 15, 2005, at A3, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0514p 03s01-
usju.html?s=yaht. 
50. Panel members would not be delegates: when their decisions have official effect, they 
may be neither designated nor directed by particular economic or social organizations.  Cf. OR. 
CONST. art. I, § 21; Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B.). 
51. After Oregon’s large, sparsely populated eastern and southern counties lost their long 
customary seat on the appellate courts, in part due to the risk of defeat by a candidate from the popu-
lous Willamette Valley, agricultural and related interests sponsored unsuccessful initiative measures 
in 2002 and 2006 to elect appellate judges by districts rather than statewide.  Edward Walsh, Setting 
Districts for Appellate Judges Makes the Ballot, THE OREGONIAN, Aug. 4, 2006, at E1.  In other 
states, groups pursuing ethnic and other diversity on the courts may be torn about appointed or 
elected judges, favoring elections where the group has sufficient voting strength and appointment for 
statewide appellate courts.  In 1990, an incumbent California judge lost reelection to a lesbian candi-
date, who had no criticism of his performance but argued that “it seemed time for the lesbian and 
gay community to be represented on the Superior Court.”  George Markell, New Judge, New Per-
spective: Donna Hitchens Says She Brings a Respect for Diversity, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 1, 1991, at A4.  
In Oregon, minority judges have been appointed to state trial and appellate courts as well as to the 
United States District Court. 
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about courts, serve long enough, and be few enough in number—
between eleven and fifteen—to engage in joint scrutiny and discussions 
of potential nominees.  Some or all of the members might well be ap-
pointed by legislative leaders (for instance, appointment of one panel 
member might be allocated to the legislative delegation from each con-
gressional district) but not more than half should be from any one politi-
cal party.  Details regarding the composition of the professional and the 
non-professional panels are best left to statutes and amendments in light 
of experience, except for provisions (perhaps respecting appointment or 
participation by legislators) that the state constitution otherwise prevents.  
If both panels must confirm an appointment, the specifics must be de-
signed to facilitate and not to obstruct that function. 
3.  Review and Retention 
What can replace retention elections to satisfy demands for judicial 
“accountability”?  The answer must ensure the security of tenure essen-
tial both for attracting potentially excellent judges to leave other careers 
and for protecting judicial independence, but it also must assure the pub-
lic of its judges’ continued responsible performance on the bench.  For 
most states, tenure for life (or “during good Behaviour”52) is not an op-
tion, but terms longer than six years are often suggested.  No single de-
sign to secure both goals is demonstrably best, but the question lends 
itself to rational solution, at least for Oregon. 
Oregon judges are subject to removal or lesser discipline by the su-
preme court for cause, including willful misconduct, persistent failure to 
perform judicial duties, or incompetent performance.53  Judges, like other 
officials, may face a popular vote in a recall election upon the petition of 
a requisite number of voters, which is a major undertaking against a 
state-wide official.  Also, unlike an automatic retention election, recall 
petitions must specify reasons, and those reasons and the incumbent’s 
response are each given up to 200 words on the ballot.54 
 
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  The obstacles to copying the federal model are not only political 
but lie also in the larger number and varying roles of state judges and the smaller institutions capable 
of the scrutiny devoted to federal appointments.  The increasing range of judicial tasks in fact has 
also led the United States to create a variety of magistrates and specialized or administrative law 
judges not appointed pursuant to Article III. 
53. OR. CONST. art. VII, § 8.  The 1859 constitution originally provided for removal by the 
governor upon a joint resolution by two-thirds majorities in both houses of the legislature. 
54. OR. CONST. art. II, § 18.  Given the direct channel for specific complaints against a judge, 
recalls are rarely attempted and are unlikely to succeed; they may serve to publicize dissatisfaction 
similarly to running a little-known opponent in an otherwise uncontested election.  Circuit judges in 
Marion County, the usual venue for challenges to initiative measures, were targets of several recall 
petitions between 1988 and 2005.  See Crystal Bolner and Peter Wong, Recall Targets Judge in 
Measure 37 Case, STATESMAN-JOURNAL, Oct. 27, 2005, at A1. 
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Once a system already assigns the professional evaluation of poten-
tial appointees to an ongoing, non-political law commission, the same 
commission is also the logical body to evaluate a judge’s professional 
performance at prescribed intervals (perhaps eight or more years after an 
initial review at the end of a shorter term) and to decide whether or not to 
reconfirm the judge for another term.  The separate, more political, “citi-
zens’ panel” cannot participate in a reconfirmation vote; this would only 
institutionalize and intensify the threat to an independent judiciary posed 
by outright popular election, without the campaign costs.  At most, that 
panel might serve to receive public criticisms or praise of particular deci-
sions and summarize any that actually bear on a judge’s professional per-
formance for the law commission’s information. 
4.  Adaptation for Trial Courts 
How can a commission system be adapted to the selection and con-
firmation of trial judges?  Statewide individual evaluations, even by 
committees of the commission, would swamp a law commission like 
Oregon’s and distract from its primary ongoing function.  The model is 
not readily replicated locally, even in the populous Willamette Valley 
counties.  Yet, service on state courts calls for some common standards 
and procedures. 
The question requires the system to leave room for flexibility and 
change, rather than freeze its details in the constitution.  Reform might 
proceed in stages.  For instance, after experience with consulting on and 
confirming appellate appointments, the state commission, in cooperation 
with Oregon’s integrated (i.e., mandatory) state bar, might develop legis-
lation under which the commission would prepare model standards and 
procedures for gubernatorial appointment of local judges upon consulta-
tion and confirmation by regional commissions similar to those for ap-
pellate judges.  However, this is only one illustration.  If the second stage 
is delayed, Oregon’s circuit judges will continue to be appointed or 
elected, and usually retained, by whatever criteria matter to local vot-
ers—the divided system that prevails in New York and California, but 
without the partisan or other divisive complications found in those 
states.55  That need not hold up reforming the system of electing state-
wide appellate judges. 
 
55. See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008) (reversing an ap-
peals court affirmation of a district court’s injunction of partisan judicial nominating conventions); 
Norman L. Greene, What Makes a Good Appointive System for the Selection of State Court Judges: 
The Vision of the Symposium, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 35 (2007). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing comments briefly summarize Oregon’s changing ex-
perience of electing state judges and a possible approach to reforming the 
election and retention of appellate judges.  A common refrain of conser-
vatives in the 1961–62 Commission on Constitutional Revision was, “if 
it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”56  Oregon’s courts are not broken (though 
they are sometimes financially broke), but neither are most Oregon 
bridges and other infrastructure; a better time to strengthen things is be-
fore they break.  A legal system is strengthened if it does not discourage 
potential judges by the prospect of facing repeated popularity polls.  
However, people who now care about who serves on the courts need to 
believe that the alternative to popular elections will preserve their voices 
in a more rational system. 
“The Rule of Law”—our currently favored phrase to distinguish le-
gitimate from arbitrary or corrupt governance—postulates that law exists 
in some form before judges apply it.  Nominees to the United States Su-
preme Court are expected to and routinely do assure Senators that they 
will follow the law, not make it.57  The postulate demands many qualities 
for superior judging at any level, but pursuing popular outcomes is not 
one of them.  It is incompatible in principle with voter election or reten-
tion of appellate judges like political lawmakers, featuring criticism of 
their past or expected decisions and financed by groups with one or an-
other stake in those decisions.  Legal realist orthodoxy, of course, sees 
law as the product of judicial decisions and appellate judges as the pri-
mary or ultimate lawmakers.58  Those who subscribe to this view of law 
also can defend political campaigns to elect different judges, complete 
with adversary campaign slogans and funded by competing interests. 
For designing courts of law, however, the question is not which 
theory is the more realistic description.  The question rather is, or ought 
to be, what view of their role judges should bring to their task: whether it 
is to reach an outcome preferred by their supporters and their commu-
nity, or to search for and set out the most plausible, coherent, and consis-
tent solution to the legal problem at issue.  How judges respond, in the 
mass of cases, will matter less to outcomes than to the court’s explana-
tions.  Yet the difference is what distinguishes courts from lawmakers 
 
56. See generally Alfred T. Goodwin, The Commission for Constitutional Revision, 67 OR. L. 
REV. 1 (1988). 
57. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Neil A. Lewis, Sotomayor Vows “Fidelity to the Law” as Hear-
ings Start, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/07/14/us/politics 
/14confirm.html. 
58. See Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L. J. 227 (1972). 
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elected to reflect majority wishes and opinions.  The distinction requires 
a different mode of selecting and retaining judges. 
There is nothing radical about the kind of alternative described 
above; it revives proposals that Oregon commissions advocated half a 
century ago and that modern developments have only made more time-
ly.59  It would replace the now inappropriate and outdated reliance on 
competitive statewide elections conducted by professional campaign 
managers and funded by law firms and competing interest groups, while 
also replacing the more frequent appointment of appellate judges by gov-
ernors without any other independent participation.  It draws on but 
adapts the widely used commission model; it gives the governor a shared 
initiative rather than only a reactive role; it incorporates separate profes-
sional and political judgments by pre-appointment consultation and by 
eventual confirmation of nominees; and it provides for periodic recon-
firmation on the sole basis of professional performance.  The question is 
whether such a plan can overcome the drag of inertia and intuitive reac-
tion against ending elections for any office, while offering participation 
to concerned economic, social, or geographic interests at lower cost than 
competing in the electoral arena. 
Historically, the odds are against it.  Existing institutions rarely at-
tach high priority to institutional reform.  It may require more than the 
costs of modern election campaigns and mandatory recusal from cases 
involving one’s supporters or opponents to overcome this hesitancy.  If 
other voices join Justice O’Connor’s to recognize that strong and inde-
pendent state courts are a national interest, national financial incentives 
for qualifying state systems could help to secure that interest. 
 
 
59. THE COMMISSION FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, supra note 42.  See also Shepard, 
supra note 7. 
